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A commentary on
Much ado about p. What does a p-value mean when testing hypotheses with aggregated
cross-cultural data in the field of evolution and human behavior?
by Pollet, TV (2013). Front. Psychol. 4:734. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00734
Pollet (2013) recently questioned the use of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) in cross-
cultural research, when researchers sample most or the totality of the population of macro-level
units they study. According to his interpretation, if a researcher is interested in, say, the correlation
between two variables at the level of US States and includes data from all 50 US states in his sample,
then he cannot coherently provide a p-value, since the latter only makes sense for samples that are
proper subsets of the whole population.
This claim rests on the implicit assumption that a researcher who is interested in for example the
50 US states is working on a finite population, i.e., that she will have sampled the whole population
of interest if she includes data from all 50 states in her analysis. While this assumption is a deeply
intuitive one, it is also false in most cases.
In many textbook examples of statistics and probability, it does make sense to assume that we
are working with a finite population. If an urn contains 100 colored balls, and the aim of the exer-
cise is to make inferences about the proportion of red and blue balls within the urn on the basis
of random samples, then it is safe to consider that the 100 colored balls within the urn constitute
the whole population of observations. Thus, if we were to draw 100 balls from the urn and count
more blue than red balls, it would not make sense to conduct NHST to check whether there are
significantlymore blue than red balls.
In other cases, however, we cannot assume that the statistical population we study is finite (see
Howell, 2010, p.2). For instance, if we want to determine whether a die is fair based on a series
of die rolls, we reason as if the population was infinite. The series of die rolls we are studying is
considered a sample from the set of all possible rolls made with this die, and this set is intuitively
infinite (or at least very large). Pollet’s argument rests on the assumption that the discussed empir-
ical research is fundamentally different, when it comes to statistical inference, from the die rolls
paradigm described above; but it is hard to see what the basis of this claim is.
Eppig et al. (2011) is one example of a study for which Pollet questions the use of p-values.
In this paper, the researchers want to investigate the hypothesis that there is a developmental
trade-off between maximizing brain vs. immune function. They argue that their theory predicts
the existence of a correlation between average US state IQ and infectious disease stress. They
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observe the predicted positive correlation, using data from all
50 states and report the associated p-value. Contrary to what
intuition might suggest, the population for which they are using
inferential statistics is not the 50 US states. Eppig et al. are biol-
ogists, not US-states-ologists, so their object of study is presum-
ably the human brain as shaped by evolutionary processes, not
what happens to be the case in a certain country at an arbitrar-
ily chosen point in time. The reason why they gather data on US
states is because they aim at testing a general hypothesis about
brains, and presumably find it convenient to use data that has
been compiled for a country that merely happens to be the US.
Considering the population for which the authors want to make
inferences to be the 50 US states is similar to thinking that a psy-
chology experiment done on undergraduates by a Yale psychol-
ogist has for population the set of psychology undergraduates at
Yale.
Pollet argues that when using data from 50 US states to report
a correlation at the level of US states, the situation is “unlike
observations from rolling a dice, for example, where we can con-
tinue to roll a dice, and gather ever more observations” (p.1).
It is unclear which argument actually lies beneath this claim.
Clearly, “we can continue to roll a dice” cannot be interpreted
in the sense of material possibility. If we run an experiment with
a dice, but then destroy it, we are prevented from gathering fur-
ther observations of this dice’s behavior, but it would strike us as
strange to conclude that the use of NHST is thereby forbidden.
But if it cannot be interpreted in the sense of material possibility,
then it is hard to see which kind of impossibility to gather new
observations bars us from NHST.
To couch the point made by this commentary in more philo-
sophical terms, when researchers are interested in more than
mere description, their use of inferential statistics goes beyond
addressing the problem of knowing whether they have sampled
enough of the currently observable features of the world. They
also have to face a mild version of Hume’s problem of induc-
tion (Hume, 1748), that of using empirical data to draw infer-
ences about causality. In this context, the definition of the stud-
ied population is less straightforward than what a literal inter-
pretation of the term might suggest, and there is no reason to
think that such a population is not very large compared to the
sample.
I do not wish to defend the use of NHST in general, and hap-
pily acknowledge that its widespread use in the behavioral sci-
ences can be damaging (Cohen, 1994; Loftus, 1996; Ziliak and
McCloskey, 2008). Yet I do not think that issues of population
finiteness should be a cause of specific concern for the relevance
of NHST to cross-cultural research.
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